Record Number: 1032
CIS Descriptors: THERMAL BURNS
EXPLOSIONS
TOLUENE
UNSAFE ACTS
TANK TRUCKS
PETROCHEMICAL INDUSTRY
STATIC ELECTRICITY

FATALITY REPORT



REPORT CHARACTERISTICS:

DONOR: Office of the Chief Coroner
JURISDICTION: Ontario
REPORT TITLE: Verdict of Coroner's Jury
INDIVIDUAL PRESIDING: Dr. J.K. Dodds, Coroner
PLACE OF INQUIRY: Brampton
DATE OF INQUIRY : 1980-11-12

INFORMATION ABOUT DECEASED:

NAME: Donald Beverly Jinks
OCCUPATION: Loader
INDUSTRIAL SECTOR: Petrochemical industry

ACCIDENT INFORMATION:

DATE OF ACCIDENT : 1980-05-15
PLACE OF ACCIDENT: Texaco Canada Inc., 250 Lakeshore Road, West Mississauga
BRIEF CAUSE OF DEATH: Deep heat burning of the whole body surface and smoke
inhalation secondary to toluene explosion.
BRIEF MANNER OF DEATH: Due to static electricity possibly due to incomplete
following of safety procedures by Donald Jinks while loading a tank
truck.
ACCIDENT DESCRIPTION:
Donald Jinks was a 46 year old employee of Texaco who broke almost all
the safety rules of loading petrochemicals.

1. He left his pickup truck running at the site of loading.

2. He failed to block the wheels of the tanker.

3. He failed to hook up the grounding cables to the tanker.

4. He failed to hook up the safety line to his belt when he was on top
of the tanker.

5. He must have blocked the spring loaded valve so it would continue to
load and then went to get the sample bottle in its metal basket and
proceeded to lower it to get the sample while the toluene was still
loading. This is a high hazard time for static electricity.

Jinks suffered a fracture dislocation of his neck and 100% burns in the
resulting explosion and fire. He had written and passed his safety
exams the month before.

RECOMMENDATIONS ISSUING FROM INQUIRY:

1. Consider the use of a two stage valve as advocated in the "truck loading
rack" safety presentation of the Oil Insurance Association.

2. Where possible, consideration should be given to remote operation of all
loading systems in future installations.

3. Loading racks be equipped with lights indicating that grounding has been
effected.

4. Consider incorporating the sample case with the downspout to reduce the
danger of static charge.

5. Safety instructions for drivers be widely circulated throughout the
industry.

6. In safety instructions, particular attention should be given to
"relaxation time" to give static charges time to dissipate.

7. Employees be encouraged to report infractions to their joint health and
safety committee and also bring any such infractions to the attention of
the offender at the time.

COMMENTS ON RECOMMENDATIONS BY CORONER:

The driver of the tanker truck, Larry Mitton, a former loader, had knowledge
of but ignored the fact that the wheels of the tanker had not been blocked
and that the ground cables had not been hooked up. Mitton escaped with
minor burns and a hell of a scare.

1. This refers to the last paragraph of page 4 "Truck Loading Rack Safety"
of the Oil Insurance Association. Such a system is used by Esso in
Sarnia.

2. This is possible with present technology.

3. This has since been done at Texaco. Probably, pumps should be
integrated into the circuit so that they cannot be activated until
grounding is effected (second paragraph, page 9, "Truck Loading Rack
Safety").

4. Texaco has now incorporated the sample case with the downspout so
sampling occurs automatically and eliminates the necessity of passing it
through vapour which was believed to have caused the spark in the Jink's
case.

5. Self-explanatory.

6. Self-explanatory.

7. Had Larry Mitton done this on May 15, an explosion might have been
averted.

A point not mentioned by the jury but worth pointing out, particularly to
management and unions, is that drivers and loaders should be requalified
every year by demonstrations and written tests. While expert witnesses did
not consider switch loading a factor in this case, the practice should be
discouraged unless the tanker has been steam cleaned or vapour displaced by
inert gas.

The jury recommendations together with copies of the enclosures should be
sent to all:

1. refineries and petrochemical plants

2. Oil Insurance Association

3. Safety Council of Canada

4. companies who are involved in transportation of petrochemicals

5. oil chemical and atomic workers international union

6. Information and Emergency Centre, Transport Canada, Place de Ville,
Ottawa.