Record Number: 1753

FATALITY REPORT



REPORT CHARACTERISTICS:

DONOR: Office of the Chief Coroner
JURISDICTION: Ontario
REPORT TITLE: Verdict of Coroner's Jury
INDIVIDUAL PRESIDING: M. Milton M.D., Coroner
PLACE OF INQUIRY: 15 Grosvenor Street, Toronto
DATE OF INQUIRY : 1986-02-12

INFORMATION ABOUT DECEASED:

NAME: Gerome Juman
OCCUPATION: Packaging batcher
INDUSTRIAL SECTOR: Manufacturing, Packaging

ACCIDENT INFORMATION:

DATE OF ACCIDENT : 1985-11-21
PLACE OF ACCIDENT: Unavailable
BRIEF CAUSE OF DEATH: Trichloroethane poisoning.
BRIEF MANNER OF DEATH: Preventable accidental inhalation of trichloroethane
when cleaning a vat at 3L Custom Packagers/Langstaff Laboratories at
approximately 4:30 p.m. on November 21, 1985.
ACCIDENT DESCRIPTION:
This 24 year old man had been working for Langstaff Laboratories Limited
for about ten months, first as a general labourer, and then as a
"Batcher", meaning that he could work in preparation of materials for
packaging, such as Freon-11, etc. On November 21st around 1500 or 1600
hours, he was requested to clean out the smaller of two vats, one five
feet diameter, five feet deep, using 1,1,1-Trichloroethane.

He was last seen by three employees, separately, at different times, at
the vat cleaning it out, standing on a ladder and wearing a "3-M"
dust/fume/mist respirator 9920, rubber gloves, work boots. All the
employees left work between 1630 and 1800 hours, and he was not seen
leaving, and there was no "buddy system" in place. He did not return
home from work that night, and his wife telephoned a relative who also
worked at Langstaff and requested him to look for him. He was found
lying on his back at the bottom of the vat, no ladder inside.


RECOMMENDATIONS ISSUING FROM INQUIRY:

1. Instructions for the use of all safety equipment should be clearly
posted.

2. There should be some type of covering, possibly gridwork, that would
cover the top of a vat. The spacing of the gridwork should be open
enough to prevent the entry of a person, but would not obstruct the
normal operations of the vat.

3. Written instructions for vat entry should be on or near the vat. They
should always be legible.

4. All personnel should be trained on safety equipment and artificial
resuscitation, on joining the company.

5. The safety procedures should be reviewed by all employees at least every
ninety days.

6. The "buddy system" should be used when a hazardous task is assigned to
an employee.

7. The Occupational Health and Safety Branch of the Minsitry of Labour
should perform annual inspections of all industries employing hazardous
chemicals.

8. The definitions of "fumes" and "vapours" should be made more
understandable to the layman. These definitions should be included in
all instructions and regulatory literature.

9. Management should take every precaution that proper apparatus is used
when performing a hazardous duty.

10. There should be platforms encircling elevated vats.

11. There should be a removable ladder, hooked over the rim, to be used
inside the vat when a cleaning or repairing task is to be performed.

12. There should be further investigation of 3L custom packagers by the
Occupational Health and Safety Branch of the Ministry of Labour.

COMMENTS ON RECOMMENDATIONS BY CORONER:

1. Evidence had indicated that such instructions had not been posted, and
the jury wished to stress that each employee was to be made more aware
of proper operation of the equipment, in case of accidents (being,
chemical spills, etc.).

2. This recommendation was made because the enquiry did not reveal how
Gerome ended up in the bottom of the vat. They wished this
recommendation to be followed, to prevent someone from accidentally
entering the vat (such as a fall when working inside). Also, the jury
felt that if the covering should be off, if would be obvious that
someone was in the vat.

5. To be sure that procedures for safety are not forgotten.

6. To ensure that supervisory personnel take the responsibility of safe
completion of hazardous tasks.

8. The employees were very hazy on the definitions of mist, vapour, fumes,
gases, etc.

9. The jury believed that Juman ought to have been using a proper air-flow
respiratory.

10. The jury recommended this so that there would be more stability than a
ladder would provide.

11. We do not know how Gerome ended up in the vat, but evidence showed that
even if he had climbed in, in order to mop up some solvent, the fumes
would have laid him out very swiftly, but he might have had time to
climb out had there been a ladder inside.






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